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the Polish Agency for Health 
Technology Assessment in 2012-2015 
Abstract 
 
Transparency is recognised to be a key underpinning of the work of health 
technology assessment (HTA) agencies, yet it has only recently become a subject 
of systematic inquiry. We contribute to this research field by considering the 
Polish Agency for Health Technology Assessment (AHTAPol). We situate the 
AHTAPol in a broader context by comparing it with the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in England. To this end, we analyse all 332 
assessment reports, called Verification Analyses, that the AHTAPol issued from 
2012 to 2015, and a stratified sample of 22 Evidence Review Group reports 
published by NICE in the same period. Overall, by increasingly presenting its key 
conclusions in assessment reports the AHTAPol has reached the transparency 
standards set out by NICE in transparency of HTA outputs. The AHTAPol is more 
transparent than NICE in certain aspects of the HTA process, such as providing 
rationales for redacting assessment reports and providing summaries of expert 
opinions. Nevertheless, it is less transparent in other areas of the HTA process, 
such as including information on expert conflicts of interest. Our findings have 
important implications for understanding HTA in Poland and more broadly. We 
use them to formulate recommendations for policymakers.  
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Introduction 
 
In their daily operations, health technology assessment (HTA) bodies make 
decisions or recommendations involving patients’ lives and large sums of public 
money. Given the many interests this inevitably attracts, and the global trends 
towards evidence-based policy-making and good governance, it is unsurprising 
that transparency has been a long established principle of good practice in HTA 
(Drummond et al. 2008). Notably, it is part of the mission and value statement of 
the European Union network for Health Technology Assessment (EUnetHTA 
2017), and has been put forward as a solution to the less-than-perfect utilisation 
of HTA by decision-makers  (Sorenson, Drummond, and Kanavos 2008) or the 
low acceptance of its outputs by the public and stakeholders (Panteli et al. 2015). 
Recommendations to increase transparency are commonplace (Hailey 2003, 
Franken, Polain, et al. 2012), but systematic evaluations of the levels of 
transparency achieved by individual HTA agencies in practice have been 
relatively rare thus far (Inotai et al. 2012), with a recent comparison of 
availability of information in formal decision-making frameworks in 36 countries 
is a rare exception (Panteli et al. 2015).   
 
To address this gap in research, we analyse the level of transparency of HTA in 
Poland and compare it to the transparency of the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE) in England. While NICE is commonly accepted as the 
gold standard in transparency of HTA procedures (del Llano-Señarís 2015, 
Meneu 2015), the importance of transparency was initially slow to be recognised 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Kolasa et al. 2012). The Polish Agency for 
Health Technology Assessment (AHTAPol), despite its status as a leader in HTA 
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in CEE (Löblová 2016), did not mention transparency explicitly in its early 
methodological guidelines (AHTAPol 2007, 2009). Only the latest guidelines 
place it at the heart of the definition of HTA as a contribution to evidence-based 
policymaking (AHTAPol 2016). 
 
Previous research on transparency in HTA in Poland has emphasised two 
aspects, as described by Meneu (Meneu 2015). These are “transparency of HTA 
bodies and of HTA decisions”. In the first case, transparency of HTA bodies, the 
very operation of the appraisal body, the Transparency Council, has been a major 
improvement in the area of transparency (Kolasa et al. 2011a). Nevertheless, the 
AHTAPol has faced challenges in ensuring the transparency of its relationships 
with key stakeholders in the drug evaluation process, especially policymakers 
(Nizankowski and Wilk 2009) and drug manufacturers (Ozieranski, McKee, and 
King 2012, Kolasa et al. 2011b), although, of course, these problems are not 
unique to Poland. Similar findings have been reported in other EU countries, 
especially in CEE (Gulácsi et al. 2014, Franken, Le Polain, et al. 2012). 
 
In the second case, transparency of HTA decisions, research has concentrated on 
AHTAPol’s recommendations and their relatively weak relationship with the 
final reimbursement decisions (Kawalec and Malinowski 2016, Kolasa, 
Dziomdziora, and Fajutrao 2011). The AHTAPol also faced complaints that, 
although its recommendations were publicly available, extensive redactions 
often made it impossible to understand their content (Plisko n.d.). This has, 
however, changed and a recent study concluded that the introduction of a policy 
to clarify procedures for disclosing information had enabled the AHTAPol to be 
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more assertive when responding to manufacturers’ requests to redact 
information considered as “commercially sensitive” (Bochenek et al. 2016). This 
was associated with a marked increase in transparency of AHTAPol’s 
recommendations. Similar initiatives have been implemented in other European 
countries (Inotai et al. 2012, Kolasa et al. 2012). With few exceptions, there has 
been less interest in studying the transparency of the earlier, “assessment” part 
of the HTA process and its outputs (Kolasa et al. 2011a). Our study is a step 
toward addressing this gap. 
 
We focus on  “verification analyses” (VAs) produced by the AHTAPol.  These are 
assessments of evidence compiled by drug manufacturers that play a key role in 
developing HTA recommendations. By using existing evidence compiled by the 
manufacturers, they seek to obviate the need for new analyses. They can thus be 
considered as a “light” approach to HTA, equivalent to Evidence Review Group 
(ERG) reports within the Single Technology Appraisal (STA) undertaken by the 
NICE (Kaltenthaler et al. 2011).  
 
Because the data for analysis is presented by stakeholders with a clear business 
interest in its outcome, it is essential to ensure that the HTA assessment is 
rigorous, avoiding the risk of becoming a “black box” (Sandman and Gustavsson 
2016). There are several reasons. First, all decisions with major public health 
and budgetary consequences should be open to scrutiny to ensure democratic 
legitimacy (Landwehr and Böhm 2014). Second, a transparent process supports 
stakeholder involvement, enabling all interested parties to submit meaningful 
comments on emerging decisions (Panteli et al. 2015).  
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Building on Meneu’s typology (Meneu 2015) and Garrido et al’s earlier 
conceptual work on HTA (Velasco Garrido, Zentner, and Busse 2008), we 
evaluate, first, the transparency of the process of developing VAs, including 
rationales for withholding information from the public, information on authors 
and contributors, timelines, and types of evidence considered. Second, we 
evaluate the transparency of HTA outputs, or the key conclusions from the 
evaluation of the medical technology submitted for approval for state 
reimbursement, including clinical effectiveness, safety, cost-effectiveness and 
budgetary impact. We present our analytical approach in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
We evaluate the availability of information on each dimension of transparency 
using three criteria:  
 Is there an explicit framework for the provision of the relevant 
information (e.g. a table or a section in VAs)?  
 Is the information actually included within this framework?  
 Is the information visible or redacted?  
 
Accordingly, for information to be fully transparent it must meet all three 
criteria, i.e. be included in an explicit framework and visible. 
 
We assess whether and how transparency of Polish HTA has changed over time. 
Following recent research findings highlighting the positive impact of the new 
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official guidance on the transparency of ATHAPol’s recommendations we expect 
to see a similar gradual improvement in relation to VAs (Bochenek et al. 2016). 
We also conduct an exploratory analysis of a sample of NICE’s ERG reports and 
compare the levels of AHTAPol’s transparency with that of NICE. Here we expect 
to identify areas where Polish HTA lags behind NICE’s operations.  
 
This article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss regulatory 
frameworks that the AHTAPol and NICE use in developing their assessment 
reports. Next, we describe our methodology. Following this, we present our 
evaluation of AHTAPol’s VAs and NICE’s ERG reports. Finally, we set our findings 
in a broader policy context and formulate policy recommendations.  
Background 
 
Poland’s reimbursement legislation, enacted as the Law on Health Care Services 
Financed from Public Sources (2004) and the Reimbursement Act (2011), and 
further specified by Ministerial ordinances (Minister of Health 2012), stipulates 
that every application for reimbursement of a medicine for a particular 
indication must be supported by a set of HTA analyses, covering clinical, 
economic, budgetary impact and rationalisation issues (the last comprising 
measures to mitigate any additional budgetary expenditure). The manufacturer 
submits these analyses, typically compiled by consultancy firms, to the Ministry 
of Health (MoH), which is then supposed to pass them “without any undue delay” 
to the AHTAPol. Once received, AHTAPol’s analysts develop a VA, which is then 
forwarded to the Transparency Council (TC), comprised of senior healthcare 
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experts appointed by the Minister of Health. Reports from TC sessions suggest 
that VAs constitute the primary source of evidence considered by the TC, with 
contributions from clinical experts or patient organisations being less 
prominent. The opinion of the TC as to whether a drug should be reimbursed or 
not is then considered by the President of the AHTAPol, together with the VA. 
The President issues a recommendation to the Minister of Health, which may 
differ from the TC opinion. Subsequently, the VA, the TC opinion and the 
President’s recommendation are passed to the Ministry of Health and become 
the basis of price negotiations with the manufacturer, led by the Economic 
Committee at the MoH and subject to the Minister’s final decision.   
 
While the ATHAPol receives core public funding, the cost of developing a VA is 
covered by the manufacturer, with the upper limit of 150,000 PLN (£30,000). 
The Minister has 180 days to reach a decision on a new reimbursement 
application, including 60 days during which the AHTAPol President must reach a 
recommendation after receiving the reimbursement application from the MoH. 
 
The transparency of VAs is subject to several regulations that may, in some 
circumstances, conflict. The AHTAPol has a duty, introduced by the 
reimbursement legislation, to make VAs publicly available on the Internet, 
together with the corresponding manufacturers’ HTA analyses and any 
comments on VAs, including, for example, clarifications by the manufacturer. 
Publication should take place at least eight days before the corresponding TC 
session (AHTAPol 2015). However, the AHTAPol is also subject to the Law on 
Unfair Competition (1993), which states that revealing an enterprise’s 
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“commercial secrets” constitutes unfair competition. The Law on Protection of 
Personal Information (1997) also requires that processing personal data, 
including its publication, must be consensual and “necessary” for meeting legal 
obligations of an institution or advancing the public interest.  
 
The AHTAPol has gradually clarified these conflicting regulatory requirements in 
relation to VAs (Bochenek et al. 2016). An initial Communication emphasised 
that the transparency of public information may only be limited in exceptional 
circumstances and demanded that manufacturers’ requests for redacting 
information from VAs be clearly justified with respect to its “economic value” 
(AHTAPol 2012). A subsequent communication stated that the AHTAPol would 
only redact VAs in response to requests from the manufactures (AHTAPol 2014). 
The only pieces of information that the AHTAPol would redact on its own 
initiative would be those “directly” concerning risk-sharing instruments and 
prices proposed by drug manufacturers, an important innovation brought in by 
the Reimbursement Act, seeking to manage the budgetary impact and prices of 
new medicines by relating them to their health effects or volume of sales 
(Kawalec et al. 2016). By contrast, the AHTAPol would publish all other 
information, in particular, data on clinical effectiveness, safety, cost-
effectiveness, budgetary impact and reimbursement arrangements in other 
countries. Most of these measures were broadly supported by HTA consultants 
(Jakubiak 2014), with more scepticism shown by the industry, highlighting the 
need for further refinement (INFARMA and IGFP 2014). 
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As already noted, the AHTAPol’s drug appraisals are broadly similar to NICE’s 
STA, first undertaken in 2005 (Kaltenthaler et al. 2011). Like the AHTAPol’s HTA 
process, STAs concern mostly new technologies for a single indication based 
primarily on clinical and economic evidence submitted by manufacturers. In 
contrast to the AHTAPol, NICE outsources the development of assessment 
reports to Evidence Review Groups (ERGs), independent external academic 
centres (NICE 2017). While in STAs the appraisal phase is also led by senior 
health experts, it puts greater emphasis on consultation with patients, clinicians 
and the industry (NICE 2014). Another difference between them is that NICE 
provides only indicative timelines for various stages of the STA process, 
including the development of ERG reports (NICE 2009). Finally, unlike 
AHTAPol’s advisory recommendations, those developed by NICE must be 
implemented by health commissioners within a specified period. 
 
NICE considers public availability of evidence a vital form of transparency 
(NICE 2014). In addition to the types of documents published by the AHTAPol, 
NICE also publishes, in their entirety, comments that its consultees provide to 
the Appraisal Committee. However, neither organisation publishes expert 
opinions that inform the development of assessment reports. NICE only accepts 
redacted information “in exceptional circumstances”. First, like the ATHAPol it 
recognises that some evidence may be “commercial in confidence”, with 
potentially “a significant impact on the commercial interests of a particular 
company”. Second, unlike the AHTAPol, NICE uses the category of information 
“academic in confidence”, with potential implications for “the ability of the data 
owner to publish the information in a scientific paper” (NICE 2014). Informed by 
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agreement with industry stakeholders reached in 2004, NICE has produced 
extensive guidance on handling various forms of confidential information (NICE 
2014, ND).  
Materials and methods 
 
We considered all VAs developed in response to MoH requests to examine 
manufacturers’ reimbursement applications submitted to the AHTAPol between 
2012, when the ATHAPol started publishing VAs under the provisions of the 
Reimbursement Act, and 2015. In May-August 2016, we identified all MoH 
requests in this period and downloaded all available VAs from the AHTAPol’s 
website. We checked the website again in December 2016 to ensure that nothing 
had been missed from the previous searches. The AHTAPol developed, in total, 
63 VAs in 2012, 80 in 2013, 106 in 2014 and 87 in 2015. We excluded two 
duplicates from the analyses, one from 2012 and the other from 2015; similarly, 
we excluded two VAs, one from 2012 and the other from 2013, that were not 
available from the AHTAPol website. However, as up to 22.8 per cent of VAs 
initiated in a given year were finalised in the subsequent year, for the sake of 
clarity, we use the date of MoH requests as the basis for allocating VAs to 
calendar years.  
 
Given NICE’s uncontested status as “the most transparent of all agencies” (Llano-
Señarís 2015), we did not analyse all ERG reports commissioned by NICE. We 
constructed, instead, a stratified sample to serve as a “best-in-class” benchmark. 
To ensure comparability with the AHTAPol, our sampling frame included all ERG 
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reports linked to guidance on medicinal technologies developed within the STA 
process from 2012 to 2015. As Table 2 demonstrates, within each year we 
randomly selected, using Excel, 25 per cent of the total number of issued ERG 
reports. These reports represent 9 out of 17 NICE’s condition and disease 
categories in which we identified relevant guidance. These are blood and 
immune system conditions (2 reports analysed), cancer (7), cardiovascular (4), 
diabetes (1), digestive (2), eye (2), musculoskeletal (1), respiratory (2), and skin 
conditions (1).  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
We examined VAs and ERG reports using quantitative content analysis. A 
detailed coding framework, covering the two main dimensions of transparency, 
was derived based on an exploratory analysis of 8 VAs from different years (PO), 
and applied to VAs (NN) and ERG reports (PO). We resolved any issues in 
interpreting the data and applying the coding framework during the coding 
process and upon its completion we verified its accuracy using a sample of 16 
VAs issued at various points in each year (PO). No inconsistencies were spotted. 
The results of analysis and its interpretation were discussed within the research 
team. 
 
In investigating the transparency of HTA outputs, we focused on concluding 
sections of VAs and summary sections of ERG reports given their similar length. 
However, as the concluding sections in VAs typically covered at least twice as 
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many topics as ERG reports, when making comparisons we concentrated on 
sections on clinical and cost-effectiveness. To examine the transparency of the 
HTA process we considered introductory sections of VAs and ERG reports, while 
at the same time recognising that especially in the case of VAs, some sections had 
been removed, renamed or merged with other sections. When looking for 
information on contributions by external medical experts, and their conflicts of 
interests, we searched through the entire assessment reports using the search 
terms “eksper” and “konflikt” (VAs) and “advice”, “opinion”, “expert” (ERG 
reports). Given the small sample size, rather than examining changes in the 
transparency of ERG reports over time we merely sought to identify key 
similarities and differences with VAs. 
 
For the sake of clarity, we identify VAs using the numbers of MoH requests, while 
for ERG reports we use appraisal numbers.  
Findings 
 
We begin this section by evaluating changes in the transparency of the HTA 
process and outputs in the light of AHTAPol’s VAs. We then compare these 
findings with exploratory analysis of NICE’s ERG reports. 
1 AHTAPol: Transparency of HTA process 
1.1 Rationale for withdrawing information  
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The AHTAPol met its duty to publish VAs in 98.8 per cent of cases, with just two 
unavailable on its website (70/2012 and 54/2013). Their absence was not 
accounted for.  
 
All published VAs had some information redacted. In 19 instances, most from 
2012, the AHTAPol provided no reasons for redacting information (e.g. 71/2012, 
42/2013). Prior to VA 103/2013 the AHTAPol only provided two general 
reasons for blackouts, either protecting “commercial secrets of the applicant” or 
“personal data and commercial secrets belonging to other commercial entities”. 
In the latter case, however, the categories of people or other commercial entities 
were not specified; presumably the AHTAPol referred to HTA consulting firms 
preparing the analyses on behalf of the manufacturers. The distinction between 
the two categories of exclusions was supposed to be reflected by using different 
colours in the main body of the VA but this was never applied in practice in this 
period.  
 
Starting from VA 53/2013, and then consistently from VA 104/2013, the 
AHTAPol reformulated the reasons for withdrawing information as “protection 
of commercial secrets of the commercial entity” and “protection of privacy of 
physical persons”, tying them to specific legal grounds, namely the Law on Unfair 
Competition and the Law on Protection of Personal Information. In practice, the 
AHTAPol applied the principle of protection of commercial secrets to research 
from manufacturers’ HTA analyses cited in the VAs; in some instances this 
principle was extended even to the name of the manufacturer (e.g. 66/2014). 
While the AHTAPol stated that redactions were made in the interest of drug 
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companies, they also included the names of other entities, most likely HTA 
consultancy firms. The AHTAPol used the principle of protection of personal data 
in relation to external clinical experts (e.g. 191/14), patient organisations (e.g. 
50/2014) and authors of manufactures’ HTA analyses (e.g. 259/2013).  
 
While VAs stated that the AHTAPol undertook redactions, they did not provide 
details of the decision-making process, including who could make such requests, 
how they were processed, on what criteria they were based, and who decided.  
1.2 Authors and contributors  
 
All VAs since 2012 included a section that could list AHTAPol employees, 
external clinical experts and other contributors involved in, for example, 
analysing epidemiologic, clinical economic data or risk-sharing instruments (e.g. 
86/2012). This section was gradually withdrawn throughout 2013 and 
disappeared completely in subsequent years. Nevertheless, even when it was 
included, names of all AHTAPol employees and external experts were always 
redacted, and only in one case another contributor, a medical specialty 
organisation, was named (29/2012). 
1.3 Verification analysis timeline 
 
All VAs reported when they were completed. However, as shown in Table 3, up 
to 24.5 per cent of VAs in subsequent years provided only a monthly date of 
completion, with the percentage of those providing daily dates of completion 
reaching up to the 86.9 per cent in 2012. Further, the overwhelming majority of 
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VAs included the daily date of receiving the manufacturer’s reimbursement 
application from the MoH, thereby signifying the formal beginning of the process 
of developing a VA. Only in one instance (98/2012) the date was blacked out and 
in 9 other instances it was not provided. However, VAs reported the statutory 
deadline for returning documents to the MoH less frequently over time, with the 
percentage falling from 16.4 per cent in 2012 to 2.3 per cent in 2013.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
An even smaller, and declining, percentage of VAs provided both the date of 
receiving the reimbursement application from the MoH and the statutory 
deadline for returning the recommendation of the AHTAPol President to the 
MoH, following the completion of the VA. Among this group, only four stated that 
the deadline was 60 days, the statutory figure. In all other instances it was 
considerably longer.  While there is a proviso that the statutory deadline can be 
extended, no explanations were provided for any extensions.  
1.4 Subject of reimbursement application 
 
Only in one case was the name of the medical technology applying for state 
reimbursement redacted (119/2014) and in 15 instances the indications of 
medicines were redacted partially or entirely (1 in 2012, 7 in both 2014 and 
2015). The redactions, however, ceased in 2015. With two exceptions (56/2014 
and 105/2014), all VAs included a section specifying the reimbursement scheme 
targeted by the application. Nevertheless, we identified 28 examples issued 
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before 2015 in which the name of reimbursement scheme was removed (e.g. 
223/2013).  
 
As detailed in Table 4, with 7 exceptions from before 2015 all VAs included a 
section on possible risk-sharing instruments. Information on the inclusion of 
these agreements in the manufacturer’s application was initially redacted, with 
as much as 91 per cent of the relevant sections being blacked out in 2013. While 
these redactions were eliminated in 2015, even general types of risk-sharing 
instruments were never mentioned in any of the VAs.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
1.5 Manufacturers’ HTA analyses 
 
Only with one exception (139/2014) all VAs had a section to note the receipt of 
the four types of HTA analyses (decisional, economic, budget impact and 
rationalisation) that had to support reimbursement applications. Over time there 
was a decline in the share of VAs reporting the receipt of all HTA analyses, from 
41 per cent in 2012 to 34 per cent in 2015. In eight cases before 2015, the 
relevant section was included but information on the receipt of all HTA analyses 
was redacted.  There was, however, a slight increase in the share of HTA analyses 
whose titles and organisational authors were visible (from 26 to 30 per cent and 
from 3 to 14 per cent, respectively). 
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1.6 Expert opinions 
 
As Table 5 shows, in 2012, the share of VAs stating the number of experts that 
AHTAPol had approached for an opinion and who responded to requests was 
very high (98.4 and 91.8 per cent, respectively). Following the removal of the 
table listing contributors to the VAs (see point 1.2 above), this share declined in 
2013 and 2014, and then picked up again, reaching 38.4 and 61.6 per cent, 
respectively, in 2015. While almost all VAs had a separate table summarising 
expert opinions it did not normally provide information on the number of 
experts approached and responding to AHTAPol’s request for opinion. Further, 
the share of VAs with the summary table dropped to 91.9 per cent in 2015. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 
The removal of the table listing contributors had a negative impact on the 
transparency of data on expert opinions. As Table 6 demonstrates, while in 2012 
91.8 per cent VAs clearly stated both the number of experts approached and 
providing opinions, this share dropped to 37.2 per cent in 2015. Similarly, the 
share of VAs which included both the number of experts providing opinions and 
a summary of expert opinions dropped from 91.8 per cent in 2012 to 58.1 per 
cent in 2015  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
 19
These problems are illustrated by inconsistencies between expert numbers 
listed in the summary table and those referred to throughout VAs. For example, 
VA 114/2015 initially stated that one expert opinion had been received but the 
summary table listed no opinions. Conversely, VA 91/2015 seemed to suggest 
receiving three expert opinions but four appeared in the summary table.  
 
The inconsistency between the number of experts approached and providing 
opinions was, in some instances, explained by referring to experts’ failure to 
respond to AHTAPol’s request but in others it was not commented on. Further, 
inconsistencies between the number of opinions received and included in VAs 
can, only to a small extent, be explained by information on experts’ conflicts of 
interest. While there was an increase in the share of VAs in which some expert 
opinions were excluded (from 13.1 per cent in 2012 to 40.5 per cent in 2015), 
the share of VAs attributing exclusions explicitly to conflicts of interest was 
markedly lower (1.6 per cent in 2012 and 11.6 per cent in 2015). Even in these 
instances, however, the occurrence of conflicts of interests was merely 
acknowledged, with no further details provided. The remaining reasons for 
excluding expert opinions were not accounted for.  
 
The VAs did not provide any information on the rules for approaching experts, 
and possible exclusions of expert opinions. Only VAs 75 and 76/2015 reported 
that it was the President that made decisions as to whether expert opinions with 
conflicts of interest could be accepted.  
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Finally, as Table 7 details, the share of VAs with at least one expert name 
redacted fell from 100 per cent in 2012 to 67 per cent in 2015. The percentage of 
VAs containing at least one expert opinion redacted also fell from 18 per cent in 
2012 to 0 in 2015. Further, the average percentage of redacted expert names in 
VAs dropped from 100 per cent in 2012 to 50 per cent in 2015. Likewise, the 
average percentage of redacted expert opinions in VAs fell from 6.5 per cent in 
2012 to 0 in 2015. It was never explained, however, why experts’ names or 
opinions were redacted or not. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
2 AHTAPol: Transparency of HTA outputs 
2.1 Transparency of verification analysis conclusions 
 
Each VA had a section summarising its conclusions. As presented in Table 8, in 
2012, the share of key conclusions affected by redactions was very high. For 
example, all sections on “Relation between costs and health effects and threshold 
price” were entirely redacted. The only exception to this rule was for the section 
describing the medical technology, where there were no redactions. The share of 
redacted key conclusions was increasing in most areas in 2013 but then dropped 
considerably in 2014 and 2015. For instance, the share of redacted conclusions 
on alternative medical technologies dropped from 26.7 per cent in 2012 to 1.2 
per cent in 2015. Nevertheless, even in 2015 the percentage of redacted 
conclusions on cost effectiveness, budgetary impact or risk-sharing instruments 
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remained high (76.7, 67.4, and 50 per cent, respectively). These redactions 
typically make it difficult to understand whether the drug applying for 
reimbursement was more or less cost effective than its comparators, what the 
projected size of the budgetary impact was, and how budgetary risks would be 
shared between the manufacturer and the public payer. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
 
 
3 NICE: Transparency of HTA process and outputs 
 
Starting with the transparency of the HTA process, although some ERG reports 
mention the two main rationales for redacting information, “commercial in 
confidence” and “academic in confidence” in their initial section, this was not the 
case in the analysed sample. The appearance of some of the ERG reports suggests 
that these principles had been applied in the form of different colours at earlier 
stages of the STA process and are then replaced with uniform black colour before 
publication.  
 
All ERG reports provided a list of authors, and all but one detailed their tasks. 
Contributors, including external clinical experts, were mentioned in the 
acknowledgements section. In two cases, we found redactions applied to 
organisational affiliations. With one exception ERG reports had a section to 
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include any conflicts of interest reported by authors. Any contributor conflicts of 
interests were either included in the section mentioned above or linked with 
acknowledgements. In both cases, specific conflicts of interest were mentioned. 
However, the absence of a separate conflict of interest section for contributors 
could create ambiguity.  
 
All but one ERG reports stated a date of completion. In two cases, this was a 
monthly, rather than a daily date. The ERG reports did not state when they 
commenced, providing instead a project number.  
 
All ERG reports stated the name of the drug, its indication and characterised the 
target patient population. As any special reimbursement arrangements, called 
patient access schemes, could be negotiated between the manufacturer and the 
Department of Health during later stages of the STA process, they were 
mentioned in the final guidance documents. The guidance described the general 
nature of these arrangements without revealing the size of discounts from the 
official list price (which was publicly available). 
 
All ERG reports characterised the manufacturer’s submission in the summary 
chapters, with the company always being listed as the author. Nevertheless, only 
in five instances the manufacturer’s submission was included in the reference 
list.  
 
As mentioned above, ERG reports did not have a separate section to list clinical 
experts, nor did they state how many experts had been approached. In four 
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cases, authors were mentioned as sources of expert advice. Nevertheless in 14 
cases clinical experts were included in the “contributor” category, sometimes 
together with, for example, people providing other forms of support. In two 
cases, both authors and contributors were listed as sources of clinical advice.  
 
ERG reports did not have a separate section summarising expert opinions. 
Rather, the opinions were summarised in text in relation to specific issue, 
potentially obscuring any divergence of opinions between experts. Although 
opinions were never attributed to specific individuals in some reports with only 
one expert it was possible to establish their identity. Notably, in two cases even 
though the expert advice had been provided it did not seem to be included in the 
main body of the report.  
 
Regarding the transparency of HTA outputs, 15 out of 22 ERG reports had no 
redactions in the summary section, as demonstrated in Table 9. While the 
number of reports affected by redactions appeared to be increasing over time 
this finding must be taken with scepticism given the small sample size. 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
Conclusions and discussion  
 
To assess the extent to which the normative ideal of transparency of HTA is 
achieved in the real world, we conducted a comprehensive analysis of the HTA 
process and outputs in Poland since 2012, and compared it to the gold standard 
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of transparency, NICE, as exemplified by its STA process. Our analysis suggests 
that, overall, the AHTAPol meets or outperforms NICE’s transparency levels in 
several areas. However, there are also points where AHTAPol’s transparency lies 
behind NICE’s, and areas where both agencies could improve. 
 
The AHTAPol seems to have reached the standards set out by NICE in 
transparency of HTA outputs. The decreasing share of VAs with redacted 
conclusions regarding the nature of the health problem, description of the 
medical technology, its clinical effectiveness and safety is a clear sign of 
improvement. Perhaps surprisingly, our stratified sample suggests that the key 
conclusions presented in NICE’s ERG reports may be demonstrating an opposite 
tendency towards decreasing transparency. The VAs have also demonstrated 
progress, albeit less decisive, in key conclusions regarding cost-effectiveness, 
budgetary impact and risk-sharing instruments, where redactions remain 
common (at least 50 per cent of VAs). It is notably debatable whether the mere 
fact of reporting the inclusion of risk-sharing instruments represented an 
increase in transparency, bearing in mind that the VAs fell short of providing 
even a general description of risk-sharing instruments listed in the 
reimbursement legislation, or any potential solutions that might have been 
proposed by manufacturers. Beyond this point, however, our findings regarding 
HTA outputs are consistent with those of (Bochenek et al. 2016) who reported 
radical improvement in the transparency of AHTAPol recommendations in the 
same time period, following a clarification of AHTAPol’s policy in 2014 on 
dealing with manufacturers’ requests for introducing redactions to HTA outputs 
(AHTAPol 2014).  
 25
 
The AHTAPol seems to perform just as well, if not better, than NICE in certain 
aspects of the HTA process. It systematically publishes its assessment reports, 
VAs, and provides key types of information on reimbursement applications, 
including clinical indications and the names of reimbursement schemes. The 
AHTAPol seems to outperform NICE in providing reasons for redactions and 
applying them systematically in assessment reports. VAs also acknowledged that 
manufacturers’ HTA analyses might have been outsourced to consultants. 
Finally, the AHTAPol did a better job at reporting the beginning of the 
assessment process systematically (not included in ERG reports) and, even more 
importantly, providing tables summarising expert opinions.   
 
There were, however, important areas of the HTA process in which the AHTAPol 
underperformed against NICE. The baseline transparency related to authors, 
clinical experts and other contributors was very low (all names redacted in 
2012) and decreased even further over time with the disappearance of the 
relevant section from VAs. While the removal of information on external experts 
was somewhat compensated for by a separate section summarising expert 
opinions, the same cannot be said for other contributors. It remained unclear, 
therefore, to what extent the AHTAPol relied on the assistance of, for example, 
consultants in developing VAs. Crucially, unlike NICE, the ATHAPol merely 
reported (unsystematically) the mere fact of reporting a conflict of interest by an 
expert, without mentioning its nature, extent or commercial interests involved. 
Further, no information was provided on AHTAPol’s processes for managing 
conflicts of interest. Inevitably, this diminished the accountability of decisions 
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regarding the exclusion – or admission – of expert opinions associated with 
conflicts of interest.  
 
There were also problematic areas related to the unique design of the HTA 
process in Poland, with no direct comparison with the STA process. The 
AHTAPol lacked transparency in providing information on the beginning, 
statutory deadline and effective completion of the assessment procedures. By 
2015 it had practically stopped reporting of the statutory deadline for returning 
completed recommendations by its President. Consequently, it became less clear 
how much time the analysts, TC and President had available to, respectively, 
develop a VA, issue an opinion and recommendation. The lack of information on 
the statutory deadline could obscure instances of delayed transfer of documents 
from the Ministry of Health, which may exert additional pressure on the 
AHTAPol to process manufacturer’s submission to meet this deadline. Further, 
the absence of information on the statutory deadline made it impossible to 
establish whether it had indeed been observed. This seems to be a less pressing 
problem for NICE as the timelines for completion of subsequent stages of the STA 
process are only indicative (NICE 2009).  
 
Lastly, reporting of expert opinion in the HTA process is a key area for 
improvement for both the AHTAPol and NICE. The AHTAPol showed diminishing 
transparency in reporting the number of experts approached, providing opinion 
and those whose opinions were included in VAs. The absence of this information 
makes it impossible to evaluate the extent of non-responses in expert opinions 
and, even more importantly, the instances of reporting conflicts of interest and 
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their relationship with excluding expert submissions by the AHTAPol. By 
reporting non-attributable summaries of expert opinions, NICE’s ERG reports 
also obfuscate potential conflicts of interests of contributing experts as well as 
possible scientific dissensus.  
 
Overall, the lack of decisive improvement in the transparency of the HTA process 
in Poland might be explained with reference to the fact this area was not covered 
explicitly by the revised AHTAPol’s policy on dealing with manufacturers’ 
requests for redactions, focusing on the transparency of HTA outputs. This might 
have created a procedural loophole negatively affecting the transparency of 
AHTAPol’s work. 
 
More broadly, the challenges to transparency identified in AHTAPol’s VAs, and to 
some extent in NICE’s STA process, highlight two major concerns, familiar to 
students of delegation of authority to non-majoritarian institutions: the risk of 
their capture by private interests, and the uncertainty about the quality and 
efficiency of their work (Pollitt et al. 2001, Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001, 
Thatcher 2002). To prevent risks and suspicions of regulatory capture, HTA 
bodies (including NICE and the AHTAPol) introduce rules on conflicts of interest. 
Even the most stringent of these rules, however, lose their function as an 
indicator of legitimacy and accountability to the public interest if their 
application lacks transparency. It is for this reason that the AHTAPol’s limited 
reporting of the authors, experts and contributors to its VAs is concerning, and 
that the practice of collating expert opinion in NICE’s ERG reports deserves 
rethinking. The Polish case calls for particular caution as the gaps in reporting 
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expert opinions and conflicts of interest may be part of a broader set of 
challenges associated with widespread relationships between senior clinicians 
advising the AHTAPol and the pharmaceutical industry (Ozierański, McKee, and 
King 2012). The absence of information on contributions from, and potential 
conflicts of interests of, AHTAPol employees involved in developing VAs is 
especially puzzling given the well-documented revolving door syndrome 
between the ATHAPol and the commercial sector, including both consultancies 
and drug companies (Ozierański and King 2016).  
 
The non-existent or imperfect reporting of relevant timelines gives, in turn, 
reason for concern as transparent timelines provide a quick (if crude) indicator 
of the quality and efficiency of the body’s work. While sufficient time to develop 
HTA assessment reports does not automatically guarantee its quality, excessively 
tight deadlines might point to a problem of quality or efficiency. Extremely short 
appraisal times could indicate that HTA is merely a “tick-the-box” exercise 
without meaningful scientific input into pricing and reimbursement decision-
making. Extremely long timelines, in contrast, would point to inefficiencies 
within the agency. Either of the two alternatives calls into question the 
relationship between principal and the agent. Blurred accountability lines 
between the Ministry of Health and the AHTAPol have been well described in 
Poland (Ozieranski, McKee, and King 2012). Our findings regarding the 
insufficient reporting of HTA timelines by AHTAPol indicate a potential area for 
exercising pressure from ministerial decision-makers to expedite appraisals.  
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Our study has two main limitations. One is the use of only a stratified sample of 
NICE’s ERG reports. While a full analysis of ERG reports was not deemed 
necessary because of NICE’s established status as golden standard in 
transparency of HTA, our stratified sample suggests full examination by future 
researchers might be warranted. Another limitation in our examination of HTA 
outputs is that it did not quantify the extent of redactions and rate the extent to 
which they may affect our understanding of the key conclusions (Bochenek et al. 
2016). Nevertheless, even without using these techniques it was possible to 
investigate what transparency of HTA means in practice, as well as to test our 
key expectation regarding its improvement over time. Therefore, we contributed 
to the growing knowledge of Polish HTA, an important learning case for other 
middle-income countries, especially in the CEE region, which are in the process 
of establishing their HTA systems (e.g. Bulgaria or Romania). We also added to 
the emerging literature on comparative transparency of HTA by developing 
easily interpretable comparisons with NICE and pointing to areas for 
improvement for both bodies.  
Recommendations 
 
Our findings allow for formulating several policy recommendations for the 
AHTAPol. 
 
1. Increase the clarity of decisions regarding the selective application of 
redactions to, for example, expert names or contributions. 
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2. Reintroduce the section detailing authors and contributors at the 
beginning of each VA. It should include the number of experts 
approached, providing opinions and those whose opinions have been 
approved, as well as specific reasons for excluding expert opinions.  
3. Ensure that all VAs include information on statutory deadlines for 
returning VAs, Transparency Council’s opinions and President’s 
recommendations to the MoH. Any delays should be clearly explained. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Framework for evaluating the transparency of HTA using verification 
analyses 
 
 
 
Dimensions Components Evaluation questions 
1 
Transparency 
of HTA process 
1.1 Rationale for 
withdrawing 
information 
Are VAs publicly available and, if not, is an 
explanation provided? 
Are reasons for redacting information 
within VAs provided, including the legal 
basis? 
Are details of the decision-making process 
behind redactions provided?  
1.2 Authors and 
contributors 
Is information on who participated in the 
development of VAs available?  
1.3 Timeline of 
drug evaluation 
Is information on milestones in the process 
of development of VAs available?   
1.4 Subject of 
reimbursement 
application 
Is the name of the medical technology, its 
indications and names of targeted 
reimbursement schemes available? 
1.5 
Manufacturer’s 
HTA analyses 
Are the authors and titles of 
manufacturer’s HTA analyses available? 
1.6 Expert advice  Is information on expert advice available, 
including the number of experts, their 
names and conflicts of interests?  
2 
Transparency 
of HTA outputs 
2.1 Key 
conclusions 
Are main summary points from VAs 
available, including the subject of 
reimbursement application, health 
problem, health technology, clinical 
effectiveness, practical (real-life) 
effectiveness, safety, cost-effectiveness, 
budgetary impact, any risk sharing 
instruments proposed, and 
recommendations by other HTA bodies?  
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Table 2 Stratified sample of Evidence Review Group reports 
 
 Number of ERG reports included in the 
sample 
Total number of ERG 
reports   
2012 4 17 
2013 4 17 
2014 5 20 
2015 9 35 
Total 22 89 
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Table 3 Key milestones in the development of verification analyses 
 
Year Date verification 
analysis finalised  
Date of 
documen
t transfer 
from 
Ministry 
of Health  
provided  
 
Statutory 
deadline for 
transferring 
Verification 
analysis and 
President's 
recommendatio
n to Ministry of 
of Health  
 
Statutory 
deadline 
AND date 
of 
transferrin
g 
documents 
back to 
Ministry of 
Health  
 
Total 
number of 
verificatio
n analyses 
Daily Monthl
y 
201
2 
53 
(86.9%
) 
8 
(13.1%) 
59 
(96.7%) 
10 (16.4%) 9 (14.8%) 61 
201
3 
63 
(79.7%) 
16 
(20.3%) 
75 
(94.9%) 
15 (19.0%) 13 (16.5%) 79 
201
4 
80 
(75.5%) 
26 
(24.5%) 
103 
(97.2%) 
12 (11.3%) 11 (10.4%) 106 
201
5 
74 
(86.0%) 
12 
(14.0%) 
85 
(98.8%) 
2 (2.3%) 2 (2.3%) 86 
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Table 4 Key types of information on the subject of reimbursement applications 
included in verification analyses 
 
Yea
r 
Section 
mentionin
g the form 
of 
reimburse
ment 
applied for 
included 
Section 
on risk-
sharing 
instrum
ents 
included  
 
Informa
tion on 
possible 
risk-
sharing 
instrum
ents 
redacte
d  
Risk-
sharing 
instrum
ents 
included 
General 
types of 
risk 
sharing 
instrum
ents 
mention
ed 
Risk 
sharing 
instrum
ents not 
included 
Total 
number 
of 
verifica
tion 
analyse
s 
20
12 
61 (100%) 59 
(96.7%) 
32 
(52.5%) 
14 
(23.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 13 
(21.3%) 
61 
20
13 
79 (100%) 76 
(96.2%) 
69 
(87.3%) 
3 (3.8%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (5.1%) 79 
20
14 
104 
(98.1%) 
104 
(98.1%) 
43 
(40.6%) 
33 
(31.1%) 
0 (0.0%) 28 
(26.4%) 
106 
20
15 
86 (100%) 86 
(100%) 
0 (0.0%) 54 
(62.8%) 
0 (0.0%) 32 
(37.2%) 
86 
  
 39
 
Table 5 Requested, provided and approved expert opinions in verification 
analyses  
 
Year Number of 
experts 
approached for 
opinion 
mentioned 
Number of 
experts who 
provided 
opinions 
mentioned 
Number of 
experts 
included in the 
table 
summarising 
expert opinions  
Total number of 
verification 
analyses 
2012 60 (98.4%) 56 (91.8%) 61 (100.0%) 61 
2013 27 (34.2%) 31 (39.2%) 79 (100.0%) 79 
2014 24 (22.6%) 65 (61.3%) 103 (97.2%) 106 
2015 33 (38.4%) 53 (61.6%) 79 (91.9%) 86 
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Table 6 Relationships between requested, provided and approved expert 
opinions in verification analyses  
 
Year Number of 
experts 
approache
d and 
providing 
opinions 
both visible 
Number of 
experts 
approache
d greater 
than the 
number 
providing 
opinions  
Number 
of 
experts 
providin
g 
opinions 
and 
those 
included 
in the 
summary 
table 
visible  
Number 
of 
experts 
providin
g 
opinions 
greater 
than 
those 
included 
in the 
summar
y table 
Number of 
verificatio
n analyses 
with 
expert 
opinions 
excluded 
due to 
conflicts of 
interest 
 
Total 
number of 
verificatio
n analyses 
201
2 
56 (91.8%) 54 (88.5%) 56 
(91.8%) 
8 
(13.1%) 
1 (1.6%) 61 
201
3 
26 (32.9%) 22 (27.8%) 31 
(39.2%) 
2 (2.5%) 0 (0.0%) 79 
201
4 
24 (22.6%) 22 (20.8%) 63 
(59.4%) 
24 
(22.6%) 
1 (0.9%) 106 
201
5 
32 (37.2%) 27 (31.4%) 50 
(58.1%) 
32 
(37.2%) 
10 (11.6%) 86 
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Table 7 Verification analyses with redacted expert names or opinions 
 
Year Number of 
verification 
analyses 
with at 
least one 
expert 
name 
redacted 
Average 
share of 
redacted 
expert 
names in 
verification 
analysis 
Number of 
verification 
analyses 
with at 
least one 
expert 
opinion 
redacted 
Average 
share of 
redacted 
expert 
opinions in 
verification 
analysis 
Number of 
verification 
analyses 
listing 
expert 
opinions 
2012 61 (100.0%) 100% 11 (18.0%) 6.5% 61 
2013 64 (81.0%) 71% 4 (5.1%) 4.4% 78 
2014 82 (77.4%) 49% 5 (4.7%) 2.9% 101 
2015 58 (67.4%) 50% 0 (0.0%) 0.0% 75 
Note: VAs with no opinions in the table summarising expert opinions were 
excluded from the counts  
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Table 8 Redactions in key conclusions reported in verification analyses 
 
 
 
Subject of 
applicatio
n  
Health 
problem  
Descriptio
n of 
health 
technolog
y  
Alternativ
e medical 
technologi
es  
Clinical 
effectiven
ess  
Practical 
effectiven
ess  
Clinical 
and 
practical 
effectiven
ess  Safety  
Relationsh
ip 
between 
costs and 
health 
effects 
and 
threshold 
price  
Impact on 
public 
payer's 
budget  
Comment
s on 
proposed 
risk 
sharing 
instrumen
ts  
Recomme
ndations 
from 
other 
institution
s 
2012 23 (38.3%) 7 (11.5%) - 16 (26.7%) 30 (50.8%) 2 (16.7%) 1 (50.0%) 26 (45.6%) 60(100.0) 59 (96.7%) 20 (80.0%) 4 (6.9%) 
2013 36 (45.6%) 2 (2.5% 1 (12.5%) 23 (29.1%) 42 (56.0%) 9 (50.0%) 1 (25.0%) 33 (44.6%) 78 (98.7%) 77 (97.5%) 18 (100.0%) 3 (3.8%) 
2014 32 (30.2%) 3 (2.8%) 0 (0.0%) 20 (18.9%) 36 (37.9%) 5 (22.7%) 1 (10.0%) 37 (34.9%) 86 (81.1%) 86 (81.1%) 23 (82.1%) 5 (4.7%) 
2015 7 (8.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.2%) 4 (7.7%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (11.8%) 6 (7.1%) 66 (76.7%) 58 (67.4%) 2 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
 
Note. Given changes in the format of verification analyses the denominator for calculating the percentages in the table was the 
number of verification analyses with a particular section, and not the total number of verification analyses in a given year. 
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Table 9 Redactions in Evidence Review Group reports 
 
Year  Number of 
Evidence 
Review 
Group 
reports 
with 
redacted 
clinical 
evidence 
Number of 
Evidence 
Review 
Group 
reports with 
redacted 
cost-
effectiveness 
evidence 
Number of 
Evidence 
Review 
Group 
reports with 
redacted 
both clinical 
and cost-
effectiveness 
evidence 
Number 
of 
Evidence 
Review 
Group 
reports 
with any 
evidence 
redacted 
Total 
number of 
Evidence 
Review 
Group 
reports 
analysed 
2012 1 3 1 1 4 
2013 2 0 0 2 4 
2014 0 1 0 0 5 
2015 3 0 2 4 9 
 
 
